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COMMENTS
THE LONGSHOREMEN'S AND HARBOR
WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT AND
THE INVITEE STANDARD:
MARITIME LAW GONE AGROUND?
In 1927, Congress enacted the Longshoremen's and Harbor Work-
ers' Compensation Act (LHWCA)1 to provide a compensation system
for longshoremen injured in the course of their employment. 2 In the
years following its enactment, problems arose which induced Con-
gress, in 1972, to amend the LHWCA. 3
The original LHWCA limited injured longshoremen to compensa-
tion benefits as the sole remedy against their employers, typically
stevedore companies which contract to load or unload vessels. 4 The
injured workers were permitted, however, to maintain third-party
suits against the vessel. 5 A series of early court decisions circumvented
the exclusive benefits provision by establishing causes of action which
permitted longshoremen to recover damages indirectly from their
stevedore employers. 6 The severe economic impact of this circumven-
1. The original act was the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act, ch. 509, 44 Stat. 1424 (1927) (current version at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (Supp. V
1975)).
2. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 6-4 (2d ed. 1975).
3. Amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,
Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1263 (1972) (amending 33 U.S.C. § 901-950 (1970)).
4. 33 U.S.C. § 905 (Supp. V 1975). A stevedore company is an independent con-
tractor which hires harbor workers to fulfill contracts to load or unload vessels.
Throughout this note, the term "stevedore" will be used to refer to the stevedore com-
pany, as distinct from that company's employees. The term "longshoremen" will be used
to refer to the employees of the stevedore, and the owner or owners of a ship will be re-
ferred to by the term "vessel."
5. The exclusivity and election provisions of the original LHWCA, left intact by the
1972 amendments, were promulgated in § 5 of the LHWCA. Id.
6. In Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946), the Supreme Court ex-
tended the vessels' warranty of seaworthiness, a non-delegable duty of absolute liability,
to cover longshoremen. This extension meant that a vessel was liable to any
longshoremen injured on the job without regard to the vessel's negligence. As a result,
the vessel was liable to injured longshoremen even when the injury was the result of the
stevedore's negligence.
The vessel's duty to maintain a safe working place was absolute, even though it had
completely relinquished control of the work areas. Petterson v. Alaska S.S. Co., 205
F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 396 (1954). This placed an undue burden on
the vessel which the Court sought to alleviate in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic
S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956). In Ryan, the Court determined that when a longshore-
man is injured as a result of the stevedore's negligence, the vessel, which would be liable
under the seaworthiness doctrine, can claim indemnity from the stevedore as having
breached an implied warranty of workmanlike performance. the causes of action estab-
lished by Sieracki and Ryan allow the longshoreman to sue the stevedore indirectly by
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tion on the stevedores and the maritime industry generally was one
problem which the 1972 amendments were designed to correct.'
Another problem with which Congress was particularly concerned
was the extremely poor safety record of the longshoring industry. 8
Longshoring had one of the worst accident rates of any of the nation's
industries.9 The 1972 amendments were viewed by Congress as a
means of redistributing the liability for longshoring accidents so as to
promote safety in the industry.10
Among the many new provisions of the 1972 amendments designed
bringing a third-party action against the vessel, which could in turn sue the stevedore for
indemnification. This circumvented the LHWCA which provided that the longshore-
man's only remedy against the stevedore should be the benefits provided. See Hurst v.
Triad Shipping Co., 554 F.2d 1237 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 188 (1977). for a
particularly well-presented review of the circumvention problem. The motive behind
the development of circumvention appears to have been a reaction to the concededly in-
adequate benefits of the LHWCA. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 2. at § 6- 56: see
118 CONG. REC. 36381 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Daniels); id. at 36387 (remarks of Rep.
Hicks). However, circumvention may also have been the result of a continued desire of
the courts to maintain an independent specialized field of admiralty law.
7. Hurst v. Triad Shipping Co., 554 F.2d 1237, 1243-44 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 98
S. Ct. 188 (1977). The large number of sizable third-party suits brought under the un-
seaworthiness doctrine resulted in a heavy economic burden on the maritime industry.
which has been cited as a cause of that industry's decline in this country. See Longshore-
men's and Harbor Workers' Amendments: Hearings on S. 2485 Before the Sabcoin.
on Labor ofthe Senate Comm. onz Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong.. Ist & 2d Sess.
123- 26 (1968) (statement of Francis A. Scanlan). In addition, circumvention disrupted
the balance of liabilities established by the LHWCA so that stevedores were faced with a
double liability: payments of workmen's compensation benefits as well as possible
indemnification to shipowners for damages awarded in third-party actions. One result
of this double liability was extremely high insurance rates for stevedores. See Long-
sloremnen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1972: Hearings
on S. 2318, S. 525, & S. 1547 Before the Sabconmz. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on
Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 258-63, 288 (1972) (statement of Fran-
cis A. Scanlan). Furthermore, the great increase in third-party suits placed a severe bur-
den on the court dockets of federal district courts. Id. at 283-87. See H.R. REP. No.
1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5, reprinted in [ 1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEwS 4698.
4702-03 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT] (the committee noted its concern with
insurance rates and court backlog).
8. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 8, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 4705.
9. Brown v. Ivarans Rederi A/S, 545 F.2d 854, 861 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 969 (1977) (" 'Longshoring ... has an injury frequency rate which is well over
four times the average for manufacturing operations.' ") (quoting S. REP. No. 1125, 92d
Cong., 2nd Sess. 2 (1975)); 118 CONG. REC. 36387 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Hicks)
("Longshoring ranks second only to coal mining as the most hazardous occupation in
our Nation ....").
10. See notes 33 & 34 and accompanying text infra.
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to solve these problems, one of the most controversial" was the limi-
tation of the vessel's standard of care to fegligence. 12 Because the
statute provides no explication of the negligence standard, there have
been conflicting formulations of what the precise standard of care
should be.' 3 It is the purpose of this note to examine the inconsistent
standards adopted by the courts and to suggest one which most
closely reflects congressional rationales for reducing the liability of
the vessel to the harm resulting from its negligence.
14
In addition to delineating the problems of circumvention and
safety, the legislative history of the 1972 amendments' 5 manifests the
intent of Congress to adopt a uniform standard of care throughout the
nation, 16 to apply comparative negligence, 17 and to bar the defense of
assumption of risk.18 The House Report strongly emphasizes the con-
gressional intent to place vessels and longshoremen in the same posi-
tion they would occupy if engaged in non-maritime activities on
II. 118 CONG. REC. 36382-88 (1972) (during floor debate the primary issue of con-
cern was the reduction of a vessel's standard of care); see HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7,
at 4, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4701-02 ("One of the most
controversial and difficult issues which the Committee has been required to resolve in
connection with this bill concerns the liability of vessels, as third parties, to pay damages
to longshoremen who are injured while engaged in stevedoring operations.").
12. 33. U.S.C. § 905(b) (Supp. V 1975). This section provides in pertinent part as
follows:
In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused by the negli-
gence of a vessel, then such person .... may bring an action against such vessel as a
third party in accordance with the provisions of section 933 of this title, and the em-
ployer shall not be liable to the vessel for such damages directly or indirectly and
any agreements or warranties to the contrary shall be void.... The liability of the
vessel under this subsection shall not be based upon the warranty of seaworthiness
or a breach thereof at the time the injury occurred. The remedy provided in this
subsection shall be exclusive of all other remedies against the vessel except
remedies available under this chapter.
13. See notes 26, 27, & 37 and accompanying text infra.
14. The standard of care prior to the 1972 amendments was the absolute liability
imposed under the warranty of seaworthiness. See note 6 supra. Changing the standard
to negligence results in liability in a smaller number of cases, so that the change can be
accurately described as a reduction in liability.
15. The basic source document is the House Report. See note 7 supra. The Senate
Report, S. REP. No. 1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), is nearly identical to the House
Report and so future reference will be made to the House Report only. The congres-
sional debate relating to the 1972 amendments is located at 118 CONG. REC. 36376-
89(1972).






shore. 19 It is clear from the House Report that existing standards ap-
plicable to land-based parties should be applied, and that no special
maritime standard of care should be devised. 20 While courts must
agree that congressional intent should be effectuated, 21 they differ in
determining which specific standard of care best accomplishes this
end.
22
I. THE INVITEE STANDARD
Some courts, noting the intent of Congress to place the parties in
the same position as similarly situated land-based parties, and to es-
tablish a uniform standard, have looked to the Restatement (Second)
of Torts as the national expression of land-based tort principles. 23 A
19. In the House Report. there are four references to placing the vessel and the long-
shoreman in a position equivalent to that of land-based third parties engaged in non-
maritime activities. HousE REPORT, supra note 7, at 6-7, reprinted in [19721 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4703-04. The most definitive statement declares,
Under this standard, as adopted by the Committee, there will, of course, be dis-
putes as to whether the vessel was negligent in a particular case. Such issues can
only be resolved through the application of accepted principles of tort law and the
ordinary process of litigation-just as they are in cases involving alleged negli-
gence by land-based third parties. The Committee intends that on the one hand an
employee injured on board a vessel shall be in no less favorable position vis a vis
his rights against the vessel as a third party than is an employee who is injured on
land, and on the other hand, that the vessel shall not be liable as a third party unless
it is proven to have acted or have failed to act in a negligent manner such as would
render a land-based third party in non-maritime pursuits liable under similar cir-
cumstances.
Id. at 7, 11972] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS at 4704.
20. The House Report states,
The purpose of the amendments is to place an employee injured aboard a vessel
in the same position he would be if he were injured in non-maritime employment
ashore, insofar as bringing a third party damage action is concerned, and not to en-
dow him with any special maritime theory of liability or cause of action under
whatever judicial nomenclature it may be called, such as "unseaworthiness". "non-
delegable duty", or the like.
Id. at 6, [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4703 (emphasis added).
21. Obviously, if Congress finds that the primary purposes of its legislation are be-
ing frustrated by judicial interpretations, it may pass further amendments. Also. be-
cause Congress has the constitutional power to establish admiralty and maritime law.
Detroit Trust Co. v. The Thomas Barium, 293 U.S. 21 (1934), its determinations of the
substantive law in this field ought to be given special weight by the courts.
22. See, e.g., Hurst v. Triad Shipping Co., 554 F.2d 1237 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 98
S. Ct. 188 (1977); Gay v. Ocean Transp. & Trading, Ltd.. 546 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1977);
Napoli v. [Transpacific Carriers, etc.] Hellenic Lines, 536 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1976);
Bess v. Agromar Line, 518 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1975); Gallardo v. Westfal-Larsen & Co.
A/S, 435 F. Supp. 484 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Frasca v. Prudential-Grace Lines. Inc.. 394 F.
Supp. 1092 (D. Md. 1975).
23. See, e.g., Hurst v. Triad Shipping Co., 554 F.2d 1237 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 98
S. Ct. 188 (1977); Gay v. Ocean Transp. & Trading, Ltd., 546 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1977);
Napoli v. [Transpacific Carriers, etc.] Hellenic Lines, 536 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1976).
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careful analysis of the Restatement provisions indicates that the invi-
tee standard should be adopted as the proper rule under the 1972
amendments. The parties involved in a third-party action under the
LHWCA can be characterized as an employer (vessel), independent
contractor (stevedore), and an independent contractor's employees
(longshoremen). 24 To place the parties in the land-based relationship
which Congress intended, the rules applicable to the employer of an
independent contractor should be examined to ascertain the duty2
5
normally owed by an employer to an independent contractor's em-
ployees. 26 Such an examination reveals that an employer would be li-
able to an independent contractor's employees only to the extent that
The use of Restatement (Second) of Torts principles rather than the tort law of the ju-
risdiction in which the trial court is sitting is the best means of insuring a nationally uni-
form standard as intended by Congress. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 8, re-
printed in [ 1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4705.
24. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 407-429 (1965).
25. It is important to distinguish the question of what duty is owed from the
questions of when that duty is breached and when that breach is a proximate cause of the
injury. Some recent decisions, such as Riddle v. Exxon Transp. Co., 563 F.2d 1103 (4th
Cir. 1977), have confused these basic distinctions and unnecessarily rejected or criti-
cized the invitee standard.
In Cox v. Flota Merchante Grancolumbiana, S.A., No. 77-7338 (2d Cir. May 10,
1978), the court reversed a verdict based upon an instruction derived from the invitee
standard. The court declared that the openness or obviousness of the condition should
not affect the vessel's liability. The court noted that the stevedore had complete control
over the unloading operation and that union regulations forbade crew members from
assuming any role in the enterprise. These facts, however, should not have meant that
the shipowners did not have a duty defined by the invitee standard, nor should they have
resulted in a finding that the duty was not breached; they demonstrate only that had the
shipowner taken reasonable steps to correct the condition, those steps would have been
contractually limited to informing the stevedore, which already knew of the condition.
Consequently, had the court correctly analyzed the situation as a breach of the invitee
standard, it would have found no liability on the part of the vessel because the breach
was not a proximate cause of the accident.
The court, failing to recognize this distinction, rejected instructions based upon the
invitee standard as creating a "non-delegable duty." The invitee standard, however,
does not create a non-delegable duty. The vessel is only liable when it knows or should
have known of a danger which it fails to alleviate. This sort of duty was clearly counte-
nanced by the House Report, which expressed the congressional desire to abrogate only
special maritime duties that are absolute or non-delegable, such as the warranty of
seaworthiness. See HousE REPORT, supra note 7, at 6-7, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4704.
26. This approach was taken by the court in Hurst v. Triad Shipping Co., 554 F.2d
1237 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 188 (1977). The court adopted the applicable sec-
tions of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 409-429 (1965) (Chapter 15: Liability
of an Employer of an Independent Contractor). Section 409 sets forth the general rule:
"Except as stated in §§ 410-429, the employer of an independent contractor is not li-
able for physical harm caused to another by an act or omission of the contractor or his
servants." Because the Restatement points out that the rules in §§ 416-429, are rules of
vicarious liability which impose non-delegable duties on the employer, RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS, Introductory Note, Topic 2, at 394-95 (1965), the court applied
only the rules stated in §§ 409-415. 554 F.2d at 1249-5 1.
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it breached the duty it owed to its business invitees. 27 Consequently,
the invitee standard is the appropriate rule for third-party actions un-
der the LHWCA.
28
Under the invitee standard, a landowner is liable if she knows or
should know of a risk created by a condition on the land which she
should expect will not be discerned or protected against by the invi-
tee, and fails to use reasonable care to protect him. Even if the danger
is known or obvious to the invitee, the landowner's duty will not be
lessened if the landowner should anticipate harm to the invitee despite
such knowledge or obviousness.2 9 If applied in a comparative negli-
27. In Hess v. Upper Miss. Towing Corp., 559 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. de-
nied, 98 S. Ct. 1489 (1978), the court noted that under the independent contractor provi-
sions of the Restatement, the employer of an independent contractor owes no duty to
the independent contractor's employees. Id. at 1033. The court cited Eutsler v. United
States, 376 F.2d 634 (10th Cir. 1967), cited with approval in 559 F.2d at 1034-35. which
adopted the majority rule that workers cannot hold the employer of their independent
contractor employer on a third-party basis. This rule, developed in a nonmari-
time situation, is part of the land-based law which the courts should apply to LHWCA
actions following the 1972 amendments.
The reason for the Restatement rule is found in a Special Note to Chapter 15. which
states,
The other class of plaintiffs not included in this Chapter consists of the employ-
ees of the independent contractor. As the common law developed, the defendant
who hired the contractor was under no obligation to the servants of the contractor,
and it was the contractor who was responsible for their safety. The one exception
which developed was that the servants of the contractor doing work upon the de-
fendant's land were treated as invitees of the defendant, to whom he owed a duty of
reasonable care to see that the premises were safe. This is still true. See § 343. In
other respects. however, it is still largely true that the defendant has no responsibil-
ity to the contractor's servants. One reason why such responsibility has not devel-
oped has been that the workman's recovery is now, with relatively few exceptions.
regulated by workmen's compensation acts, the theory of which is that the
insurance out of which the compensation is to be paid is to be carried by the work-
man's own employer, and of course premiums are to be calculated on that basis.
While workmen's compensation acts not infrequently provide for third-party lia-
bility, it has not been regarded as necessary to impose such liability upon one who
hires the contractor, since it is to be expected that the cost of the workmen's com-
pensation insurance will be included by the contractor in his contract price for the
work, and so will in any case ultimately be borne by the defendant who hires him.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Special Note, Chapter 15, at 17-18 (Tent. Draft No.
7, 1962).
This note, as pointed out in Eutsler, was never incorporated into the final Restate-
mnent draft, but has been cited with approval as persuasive authority in cases adopting
the majority rule. 376 F.2d at 636.
28. The following cases applied the invitee standard in some form: Gay v. Ocean
Transp. & Trading, Ltd., 546 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1977); Anuszewski v. Dynamic Mar-
iners Corp., Panama, 540 F.2d 757 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1116 (1977);
Napoli v. [Transpacific Carriers, etc.] Hellenic Lines, 536 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1976):
Crowshaw v. Koninklijke Nedlloyd, B.V. Rijswijk, 398 F. Supp. 1224 (D. Ore. 1975);
Frasca v. Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Md. 1975).
29. The Restatement provides,
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by
a condition on the land if, but only if, he
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gence framework with the defense of assumption of risk unavailable,
the invitee standard would meet the guidelines indicated in the legisla-
tive history of the 1972 amendments.
30
In addition, utilization of this standard would further the congres-
sional desire to solve the safety problem in the longshoring industry. 31
Congress considered the imposition of a negligence standard derived
from land-based tort law to be consistent with the objective of
improving safety.32 With the 1972 amendments, Congress intended to
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition,
and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees,
and
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to
protect themselves against it, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343 (1965). The section should be read together
with § 343A. Id., Comment a. Section 343A provides in pertinent part, "(1) A possessor
of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to them by any activity or
condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless the possessor
should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness." Id. § 343A. The
statement of the invitee standard in §§ 343-343A is the more widely accepted rule for
land-based liability. See, e.g., Gay v. Ocean Transp. & Trading, Ltd., 546 F.2d 1233
(5th Cir. 1977); Napoli v. [Transpacific Carriers, etc.] Hellenic Lines, 536 F.2d 505 (2d
Cir. 1976); cf. Wescott v. Impresas Armadoras, S.A. Panama, 564 F.2d 875 (9th Cir.
1977) (analysis similar to § § 343 -343A is applied).
The facts in one early case adopting the invitee standard well illustrate the desirabil-
ity of adopting § 343A as well as the older standard of § 343. In Anuszewski v. Dynamic
Mariners Corp., Panama, 540 F.2d 757 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1116
(1977), the longshoremen noticed and reported to their supervisors an unsecured cargo
hatch. Nothing was done and the men continued to work. A cargo boom dislodged the
hatch, which fell into the hold and injured the plaintiff. The trial court rendered judg-
ment for the defendants under the invitee standard, holding that the condition was
known and obvious and that the vessel was therefore not liable. In this situation, how-
ever, it is clear that the vessel did not maintain safe working conditions through the use
of reasonable care, and that the workers, by complaining to their supervisors, did all
that they should reasonably be expected to do. It is in this sort of case that the additional
requirement of § 343A is needed to reach a just result. It was reasonably forseeable to
the vessel that longshoremen, confronted with the option of walking off the job or con-
tinuing to work under the risk, might continue to work.
30. See notes 16-20 and accompanying text supra.
31. See text accompanying notes 8-10 supra. The other major concern of Congress,
the circumvention problem, was partially solved by § 5 of the 1972 amendments. 33
U.S.C. § 905b (Supp. V 1975). That section provides that third-party suits can only be
based on negligence, not unseaworthiness, and prohibits indemnification actions by the
vessel against the stevedore. It thereby effectively blocks this particular means of judi-
cially circumventing the LHWCA. See note 6 supra.
32. The House Report describes the negligence standard as "fairer to all concerned
and fully consistent with the objective of protecting the health and safety of employees
who work on board vessels." HousE REPORT, supra note 7, at 6, reprinted in [1972]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4703. The Committee also stated that "[p] ermitting
actions against the vessel based on negligence will meet the objective of encouraging
safety because the vessel will still be required to exercise the same care as a land-based
person in providing a safe place to work." Id. at 6, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws at 4704.
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place the primary responsibility for safety on the stevedore. 33 This
localization of responsibility is consistent with the general federal pol-
icy toward occupational safety and health. 34 Some courts, properly
viewing increased liability on the vessel as contrary to the policy of
centralized responsibility, have refused to extend the vessel's duty of
care beyond that recognized by the invitee standard. 35 The invitee
standard, therefore, may be viewed as implementing congressional in-
tent with respect to the LHWCA and, more importantly, as part of a
broader federal safety policy.
II. THE INVITEE STANDARD EXAMINED
The invitee standard has not met with universal approval. A num-
ber of courts have considered it inconsistent with congressional intent
to promote safety and to prohibit the use of the defense of assumption
of risk.
33. See 118 CONG. REC. 36388 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Mink). In Marant v. Farrell
Lines, Inc., 550 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1977), the court said that "[t] his was an important as-
pect of the legislative plan, intended to focus responsibility for longshoremen's safety on
those best able to improve it, the stevedores." Id. at 144. Similarly, in Munoz v. Flota
Merchante Grancolumbiana, S.A., 553 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1977) (reversing a judgment
for the longshoreman), the court concluded that Congress intended to encourage "safety
within the industry by placing the duty of care on the party best able to prevent acci-
dents." Id. at 839.
In the House Report, however, the committee carefully indicated that reduction of the
standard of care was not intended to reduce the safety responsibilities of the vessel un-
der the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), Pub. L. No. 91-596. 84
Stat. 1590 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 15, 18, 29, 42, 49 U.S.C.). See House RE-
PORT supra note 7, at 8, reprinted in [ 1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4705. This
caveat is of limited importance because the OSHA standards as promulgated are
applicable only to the stevedore and not the vessel. See, e.g., Gallardo v. Westfal-Larsen
& Co. A/S, 435 F. Supp. 484, 498-500 (N.D. Cal. 1977); accord, Brown v. Mitsubishi
Shintako Ginko, 550 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1977).
34. Since the enactment of OSHA, federal policy has been to place responsibility
for safety on one party. Generally, this party is the employer of the workers whose health
and safety is to be protected. An employer has the general duty under OSHA to provide
employment and a place of work free from conditions dangerous to the employees. The
employer also has a specific duty to comply with promulgated standards. Although
OSHA also places a duty on the employee to comply with safety and health rules and
regulations applicable to her conduct, no penalties are exacted for failure to comply. It
is expressly left to the employer to insure compliance by the employee. See J. GRIMALDI
& R. SIMONDS, SAFETY MANAGEMENT, 313-14 (3d ed. 1975). The regulations promul-
gated for longshoring, which place the responsibility for safety on the stevedore, are con-
sistent with this policy. The invitee standard, by placing all parties involved in a long-
shoring operation in the same relationship as similarly situated land-based parties.
effectuates the congressional intent to apply general federal safety policy to the long-
shoring industry.
35. See Gay v. Ocean Transp. & Trading, Ltd., 546 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1977).
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A. Safety
In Gallardo v. Westfal-Larsen & Co. A/S, 36 the invitee rule was re-
jected in favor of a specialized maritime negligence standard.37 The
court mistakenly concluded that by incorporating the plaintiff's per-
ceptions into the standard of care required of the defendant, the invi-
tee standard would frustrate the congressional intent to compare the
negligence of both parties, which would in turn result in reduced in-
centives for safe behavior.38 Consequently, the court promulgated a
stricter standard of care,39 increasing the vessel's liability40 and de-
36. 435 F. Supp. 484 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
37. The court announced the following standard:
Before the commencement of stevedoring operations, the owner of a vessel in
navigable waters has a duty to take reasonable remedial action with respect to all
unreasonably dangerous conditions of which it has actual or constructive knowl-
edge. After the commencement of stevedoring operations, the owner of a vessel in
navigable waters has a duty to take reasonable remedial action with respect to all
unreasonably dangerous conditions of which it has actual knowledge.
435 F. Supp. at 490. This standard differs from the invitee standard in two ways. First, it
does not expressly provide that the forseeability of the plaintiff's actions should be con-
sidered in determining whether the defendant used reasonable care. Second, it extends
the vessel's duty to dangers other than those caused by conditions on board the ship, so
that the vessel could be held liable for injuries caused by the negligent conduct of the
stevedore. In Davis v. Inca Compania Naviera S.A., 440 F. Supp. 448, 457 (W.D. Wash.
1977), the court cited the Gallardo standard with approval, although it was not specifi-
cally adopted.
38. The court noted the congressional intent that third-party suits be decided under
the doctrine of comparative negligence. Id. at 492. It erroneously believed that under
the invitee standard there would be instances in which the defendant vessel, even though
negligent, would escape liability because of the plaintiff's unreasonable behavior. It is
true that under the invitee standard the vessel's duty of care is defined in part by its rea-
sonable expectations as to how the plaintiff will act when confronted with a certain con-
dition. This element of the definition, however, is no more than a recognition of the fact
that reasonable care is not defined in a vacuum; whether or not one's actions are reason-
able depends in part upon how one expects others to act. The modernized invitee
standard of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A, quoted at note 29 supra, in-
creases the vessel's burden to require not only anticipation of reasonable behavior by
the plaintiff, but also anticipation of foreseeable risk-taking behavior. A special mari-
time standard which would deny the vessel the right to act in a manner which anticipates
reasonable action by the plaintiff means that the vessel would have to act so as to antici-
pate unreasonable conduct-a burden higher than that imposed upon similarly situated
land-based parties, and not intended by Congress. See note 19 and accompanying text
supra. Contrary to the conclusion of the court in Gallardo, the vessel's negligent action
will never be a "shield" to liability under the invitee standard, because the invitee stan-
dard defines what constitutes reasonable behavior. See notes 47-49 infra.
39. The court justified the utilization of a specialized standard, despite the specific
intent of Congress that no such standard be adopted, by balancing this intent against
others (safety, prohibition of assumption of risk, etc.) indicated in the legislative history.
435 F. Supp. at 496-97.
40. See note 37 supra. Application of the special standard would clearly produce
more instances of vessel liability than would application of the invitee standard.
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creasing the longshoremen's responsibility for their own safety. 41 This
shift in the standard of care is contrary to the express intent of Con-
gress,42 and would not provide any incentives for safe behavior, as in-
dicated by the beliefs of authorities in the field of safety behavior
43
and historical experience under the old LHWCA.44 Moreover, to the
extent that this question is one of policy, it is probably best left to the
legislative process. Congress has already suggested that the primary
responsibility to maintain safety should be placed on the stevedore,
and that the burden placed on the vessel should be that of a land-
based party in similar circumstances. Independent determinations of
safety policy by the judiciary could eventually lead to the sort of judi-
41. Under the special standard proposed in Gallardo, the reasonableness of the
plaintiff's behavior would no longer be taken into account in determining the duty of
the vessel. 435 F. Supp. at 496. Thus, longshoremen would be relieved of a certain de-
gree of economic responsibility for their own safety, because the vessel's liability would
encompass both their reasonable and unreasonable behavior.
42. As discussed earlier, Congress intended to (1) place the parties under LHWCA
third-party suits in the same position as similarly situated land-based parties, (2) make
the stevedore primarily responsible for safety, and (3) incorporate national safety policy
into standards for the longshoring industry. All of these purposes would be frustrated by
adopting the specialized standard.
The courts adopting a specialized standard have placed great weight on the failure of
Congress to specifically provide that the invitee standard should be adopted. 435 F.
Supp. at 492. It does not follow, however, that this failure indicates any intent to reject
the invitee standard. It is much more likely that Congress wanted the courts to adopt the
land-based standard, but did not want to lock third-party actions into a specific stan-
dard which could become obsolete as land-based law developed.
43. There has been very little experimental work done which empirically isolates
the actual causative factors involved in industrial safety. Fitch, Hermann, & Hopkins,
Safe and Unsafe Behavior and its Modification, 18 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 618, 618
(1976). At least one study, however, has suggested that relieving workers of economic
responsibility for their own safety may increase accident rates. Chelius, The Control of
Industrial Accidents: Economic Theory and Empirical Evidence, 38 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 700, 7 10-14 (1974). See generally Margolis & Kroes, Introduction, in THE HU-
MAN SIDE OF ACCIDENT PREVENTION 3, 3-6 (B. Margolis & W. Kroes eds. 1975); Tuttle,
Dachler, & Schneider, Organizational Psychology, in THE HUMAN SIDE OF ACCIDENT
PREVENTION, supra at 7, 16-23. There is apparently no suggestion among safety author-
ities that relieving workers of the economic responsibility for their own safety would
improve safety records. Consequently, it would seem best to respect the judgment of
Congress that the most efficacious way to improve the safety record of longshoring is to
place the parties in the same relationship as similarly situated land-based parties en-
gaged in non-maritime activities.
44. The assumption made by courts adopting the specialized standard of care is that
placing a stricter standard of care on the vessel will result in a reduced accident rate. Al-
though intuitively appealing, history supports the opinions of safety authorities that im-
posing a strict standard of care on the vessel may not result in improved accident rates.
Since the decision in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946), vessels had been
under a non-delegable, strict liability duty to maintain safe working conditions, yet the
occupational accident rate in the longshoring industry was one of the worst in the
nation. See note 9 supra.
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cial circumvention of the LHWCA which led to the 1972 amend-
ments.45
B. The Defense of Assumption of Risk
The invitee standard has also been criticized on the ground that the
standard is inconsistent with congressional intent to apply the admi-
ralty rule barring the defense of assumption of risk in LHWCA
cases. 46 The view that the invitee standard incorporates the assump-
tion of risk defense is based upon a doctrinal confusion which has
long plagued the judiciary; it cannot withstand close scrutiny.47 The
two doctrines often confused by the courts are the defense of assump-
tion of risk and the "primary assumption of risk" doctrine. 48 Congress
intended to eliminate only the former.
The defense of assumption of risk applies when the defendant, al-
though in breach of a duty of care owed to the plaintiff, escapes liabil-
45. As discussed earlier, Congress has been developing a uniform safety policy. See
note 34 supra. The intent of Congress was to use the 1972 amendments to place the
longshoring industry in the same safety policy framework as other industries. If the
safety policy applicable to longshoring is altered by judicial decisions, the intent of Con-
gress to develop one uniform national safety program will be frustrated and the safety
function of the 1972 amendments will be circumvented.
46. Brown v. Ivarans Rederi AIS, 545 F.2d 854, 861, 863 n.10 (3d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 97 S. Ct. 1652 (1977); Davis v. Inca Compania Naviera S.A., 440 F. Supp. 448,
453 (W.D. Wash. 1977); Gallardo v. Westfal-Larsen & Co. A/S, 435 F. Supp. 484, 494
(N.D. Cal. 1977); See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 8, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 4705.
47. Courts have misapplied the invitee rule to release a vessel from liability for
negligent action in instances where a longshoreman became aware-of a risk. E.g.,
Frasca v. Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Md. 1975). In Frasca, the
plaintiff was injured when he fell from a grease-covered ladder. The court stated that if
the injury had occurred early in the day the vessel would have been liable under the invi-
tee standard, but because the injury occurred later in the day, after a number of uses by
the longshoreman, the danger became known and the vessel was released from liability.
Id. at 1101-02. Correctly applied, the invitee standard would establish whether there
was an initial duty on the part of the vessel to use reasonable care. In Frasca, by the
court's own admission, there clearly was an initial duty. It was the court's misuse of the
"known or obvious" provisions of the invitee standard which led it to release the vessel
from its initial duty. This is the same as adopting the assumption of risk rule.
A proper application of the "known and obvious" provision would allow a court to
determine if there were any dangers so obvious, or known in fact, that the vessel could
reasonably anticipate longshoremen to take self-protective action upon entering the
premises. When a longshoreman discovers a latent danger which the vessel had an initial
duty to correct, the invitee standard plays no role in determining whether the plaintiff
assumed the risk. In such circumstances, the rules specifically governing assumption of
risk would normally be determinative; however, in the case of third-party suits under
the LHWCA, Congress has expressed its intent that assumption of risk not apply.
48. Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54, 68-69 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). The two doctrines are distinguished in V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLI-
GENCE § 9.1, at 158 (1974).
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ity because the plaintiff became aware of the danger and assumed the
risk of injury. 4 9 This defense applies without regard to the
reasonableness of the defendant's own conduct; thus, a vessel could
fail to use reasonable care to prevent an extremely dangerous and un-
reasonable risk, and nevertheless escape liability for the plaintiff 's
consequent injury because the plaintiff assumed the risk of injury.
Congress, aware that injuries are frequently caused by conditions
which arise before longshoring operations commence, 50 wanted to
avoid insulating the vessel from liability for its own negligent acts and
therefore expressed its intent to proscribe the defense of assumption
of risk.
5 1
This defense, however, must be distinguished from the doctrine of
"primary assumption of risk," for it is this doctrine, and not the de-
fense of assumption of risk, that is inherently incorporated in the invi-
tee standard. 52 "Primary assumption of risk" means that in determin-
ing the reasonableness of the defendant's actions, one element to be
considered is the reasonably foreseeable actions of others. The doc-
49. In his concurring opinion, in Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54.
68-89 (1943). Justice Frankfurter said,
[I] n the setting of one set of circumstances, "assumption of risk" has been used as
a shorthand way of saying that although an employer may have violated the duty of
care which he owed his employee, he could nevertheless escape liability for dam-
ages resulting from his negligence if the employee, by accepting or continuing in
the employment with "notice" of such negligence, "assumed the risk." In such situ-
ations "assumptions of risk" is a defense which enables a negligent employer to de-
feat recovery against him.
318 U.S. at 68-69. See also V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 48, § 9.1.
50. See, e.g., Bossard v. Exxon Corp., 559 F.2d 1040 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
98 S. Ct. 1510 (1978) (petroleum fumes asphyxiated worker); Hess v. Upper Miss. Tow-
ing Corp., 559 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1489 (1978) (petroleum
fumes exploded); Ruffino v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co., 559 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1977)
(gap between cargo and ship skin hidden); Marant v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 550 F.2d 142
(3d Cir. 1977) (cocoa bean cargo incorrectly stowed); Anuszewski v. Dynamic Mariners
Corp., Panama, 540 F.2d 757 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1116 (1977)
(unsecured hatch support beam); Davis v. Inca Compania Naviera S.A., 440 F. Supp.
448 (W.D. Wash. 1977) (sloping ship deck which employee had to traverse to reach his
work station covered with wheat chaff); Frasca v. Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc., 394 F.
Supp. 1092 (D. Md. 1975) (hatch access ladder covered with grease).
51. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 8, reprinted in [ 1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 4705.
52. The Restatement (Second) of Torts indicates that the invitee rule is used to de-
termine the duty of a landowner to his invitees, and that the defense of assumption of
risk is a separate doctrine discussed in §§ 496A-496G. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 343A, Comment d (1965). In Comment d to § 496C, it is noted that although
the distinction between assumption of risk and initial duty may be of limited impor-
tance since the result under either doctrine is often the same, the distinction may be im-
portant where statutes have abrogated the defense of assumption of risk. In Comment e,
it is further noted that the boundaries of the defendant's duty to act do not always coin-
cide with those of the plaintiff's assumption of risk. Id. § 496, Comments d-e.
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trine, therefore, is one part of the analysis which leads to a determina-
tion of whether the defendant had a duty toward the plaintiff in the
first instance and, if so, what that duty was. 53 If the doctrine were
eliminated from a consideration of the defendant's conduct, then to
escape liability, a defendant would have to act so as to anticipate both
reasonable and negligent conduct.54 Congress did not intend such a
standard;55 statutory abolition of the defense of assumption of risk
should not result in the rejection of the "primary assumption of risk"
doctrine in determining the defendant's duty.5 6 Therefore, this argu-
ment is not a sound basis upon which to reject the invitee standard.
III. CONCLUSION
Congress, desiring that the courts establish a standard of care
equivalent to that of similarly situated land-based parties, drafted a
53. See Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54, 68-73 (1943) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring); V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 48, § 9.1.
54. Assessing the vessel's conduct in a vacuum, with no consideration given to the
reasonably foreseeable actions of longshoremen, would establish a standard of care
equal to strict liability. The vessel would have to act so as to anticipate and prevent
harm to a longshoreman no matter how unreasonable their conduct.
The facts of two cases illustrate and distinguish the two doctrines. In Frasca v.
Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Md. 1975), a workman was injured
when he fell from a grease-coated hatch access ladder. The danger was not initially
known or obvious, so under the "primary assumption of risk" doctrine, the vessel
breached a duty of reasonable care owed to the longshoreman. The longshoreman had
discovered the defect yet continued to use the ladder. This should have no impact on the
vessel's liability under "primary assumption of risk." The defense of assumption of risk,
however, would operate to prevent the injured longshoreman's recovery. In order to
avoid such results, Congress sought to eliminate this defense.
This situation should be compared with that presented in Bossard v. Exxon Corp., 559
F.2d 1040 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1510 (1978), in which the ship was full
of dangerous residual petroleum fumes. The longshoremen were employed to clean out
these fumes and were fully aware of the danger. Under the "primary assumption of risk"
analysis, the vessel had no duty in the first instance since the danger was known. The
longshoremen, once on the job, were responsible for their own negligent actions (as long
as they were aware of the risk or it was obvious) and the vessel was not required to an-
ticipate any dangerous conduct. The same result would be reached by applying the de-
fense of assumption of risk analysis. The longshoremen were aware of the dangers of the
petroleum fumes, and by agreeing to accept the job assumed the risk of injury.
55. See notes 24-28 and accompanying text supra.
56. In Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Lines R.R., 318 U.S. 54 (1943), the Supreme Court
considered the abolition of the defense of assumption of risk in the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (Supp. V 1975). In his concurring opinion, Justice
Frankfurter pointed out that abolishing the defense of assumption of risk should in no
way affect the question of when a defendant has used reasonable care. 318 U.S. at 72. It
must first be determined whether the defendant breached any duty owed the plaintiff. If




general statute which was accompanied by an abundance of legisla-
tive history indicative of congressional intent. This legislation, the
1972 amendments to the LHWCA, permits the courts to determine at
any time what the appropriate land-based standard may be and to ap-
ply it to third-party LHWCA suits. As land-based law develops, the
LHWCA standard should stay in step.
At present, the standard which best effectuates congressional intent
is the invitee standard. If it is adopted uniformly for use in third-party
cases arising under the LHWCA, the issues to be considered will be as
follows:
(1) Did the vessel know, or by the exercise of reasonable care should it have
known, of a dangerous condition on board?
(2) Was the danger of such a nature that the vessel could have reasonably
expected the plaintiff to have anticipated the harm and acted to protect
himself from the danger?
If, upon examination of the relevant facts, the answers to these
questions demonstrate that the vessel should have anticipated that
harm might occur from a condition on board, the vessel should be
held to a duty of reasonable care to protect the plaintiff from harm. If
such a duty is found to exist in the first instance, it should not be dis-
charged by a later assumption of risk by the plaintiff.
Construing the legislative history of the 1972 amendments to ig-
nore the directive that no special maritime standard be applied could
result in a circumvention of congressional purposes analogous to that
which led to the 1972 amendments. The invitee standard should
therefore be adopted and applied to all third-party actions arising un-
der the 1972 amendments.
Thomas W. Burt
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